This study examines whether audit fees reflect risk premiums in the presence of control risk after controlling for audit effort through audit delay. Our results indicate that auditors adjust risk premiums as well as audit efforts in response to altered control risk. Further analysis shows that the extent of risk premium adjustment varies depending on the severity of the underlying internal control problems. Overall, these findings provide insight into the distinct role of audit effort versus risk premium in audit pricing decisions.
Introduction
Recent research (Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hoitash et al. 2008; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Munsif et al 2011; Hoag and Hollingworth 2011) has examined the association of audit fees with internal control risk using the publicly available data on the effectiveness of internal control mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter, SOX). These studies find that audit fees are significantly higher for firms disclosing internal control material weakness, and the remediation of a material weakness leads to audit fee reductions. The consistent findings from these studies are interpreted as auditors managing control risk by exerting more audit effort in audits of firms with weak internal controls, resulting in increased audit fees.
However, as noted in Hogan and Wilkins (2008) , the documented fee increase could also be due partially to a risk premium associated with internal control deficiencies. The audit fee model developed by Simunic (1980) suggests that audit fee is a function of audit effort and of the auditor's expected future losses arising primarily from the litigation risk. Stated differently, auditors may respond to increased client risks by charging a premium to insure against potential litigation as well as exerting more engagement effort. Prior studies show the disclosure of internal control weaknesses is often associated with lower accruals quality and higher frequencies of restatements (Doyle et al 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al 2008) , which in turns increases the likelihood of litigation against auditors (Barron et al 2001; Heninger 2001; Abbot et al 2006) . This seems to suggest that in the presence of increased control risk, although auditors can manage risk by performing additional substantive tests, such tests cannot uncover all possible misstatements, especially frauds perpetrated through management collusion . To the extent that auditors price control risks that can't be reduced by additional auditing, they may be charging clients a premium to compensate them for possible future litigation losses.
The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze whether audit fees reflect a premium for control risk. Our sample comprises all firms that filed Section 404 reports over the period of [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . We employ a research design that enables us to disentangle the two alternative explanations for the audit fee effect. We find, after controlling for auditor effort (proxied by audit delay), a positive association between changes in audit fees and changes in the quality of internal control, indicating that control risk explains a significant amount of variance in audit fees over and above that explained by audit effort. This result supports the view that auditors adjust the risk premium charged to clients for the assessed control risk in addition to the scope and nature of audit work. Further analysis shows that changes in audit fees due to the risk premium vary depending on the severity of the underlying internal control problems.
We find that auditors consider the type of weakness (i.e. general weaknesses vs. account specific problems) when adjusting upward the risk premium in response to increased control risk, but not when they adjust downward the risk premium for decreased control risk. This result is consistent with auditors taking a more conservative approach when pricing the control risk for clients that have previously experienced internal control problems, regardless of the type of weakness involved.
The above conclusions are drawn from the changes analysis. We adopt a changes analysis approach for two reasons. First, results based on a cross-sectional association are vulnerable to correlated omitted variables and endogeneity problems (Johnstone et al. 2010) . As a result, it is difficult to interpret the results because the reported parameter estimates from levels regressions may be biased. A changes model allows us to control for unobservable company characteristics assumed to be constant over time and mitigate potential endogeneity bias 1 . Second, while levels analysis tests the cross sectional differences in audit fee levels between firms, changes analysis examines fee changes over time within the same firm. Thus, the fee change design allows us to directly measure auditors' responses to changes in control risks, and increases our ability to draw a causality relationship between internal control material weaknesses and audit efforts/risk premiums. For completeness, we also perform levels analysis and obtain results that are generally consistent with those derived from the changes model.
Our study corroborates and extends prior research on audit fees and control risk. While much of the prior work in this area consistently finds higher audit fees in the presence of internal control weaknesses, little is known about whether the documented fee increment is attributable to extended audit effort and/or a higher risk
premium. An exception is the study by Bedard and Johnstone (2004) which finds that auditors charges a higher hourly billing rate to clients with higher control risk as a premium to cover costs related to potential future litigation. However, our study differs from theirs in two important ways. First, we focus on auditors' assessments of control risks and their pricing decisions in the prensence of the identified risks, while 1 For example, Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006) argue that changes models yield more accurate results because they are overall less subject to biases. their study focues on auditros' assessments of earnings manupilation risk and corporate governance risk, with control risk being included as a control variable in their model. Second, their study relies on data derived from engagement partners' assessments of their clients' internal control quality from a single year preceding the mandatory SOX 404 disclosure requirements, and thus is limited to one audit firm and a small sample size. In comparison, our study uses a much broader sample based on publicly available data that cover an extended period from 2004 to 2009, which enables us to conduct a more comprehensive analysis of and draw more reliable inferences about the relationship between internal control quality and the risk premium. The results in this study provide new insights into the distinct role of audit effort versus risk premium in explaining the variations in audit fees.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides the literature review and develops our hypotheses; Section 3 describes the research design;
Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and multivariate results; Section 5 presents additional analyses and Section 6 contains conclusions of this study.
Background, Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Section 404 background
Internal control is a major focus of recent SOX regulatory changes. Prior to SOX, disclosure of significant internal control deficiencies was publicly required only when companies changed auditors. Public firms could voluntarily report on the effectiveness of internal controls, but few firms did so. SOX Section 404 explicitly requires an annual report on internal controls over financial reporting to be filed with the SEC Form 10-K. More specifically, Section 404 (a) requires management to establish, monitor and sustain adequate internal control and assess the effectiveness of their internal controls, and Section 404(b) requires that auditors attest to management's assessments and provide a separate opinion about internal control effectiveness based on their own review of the firm's internal controls. 2 The auditor's report must include the disclosure of any material internal control weaknesses, and procedures and corrective actions taken regarding those weaknesses. When one or more material internal control weakness exists, the auditor is required to issue an adverse opinion on the effectiveness of internal controls.
Literature review and hypothesis development
The SOX section 404 internal control disclosures provide an objective and reliable measure of auditors' assessments of internal control risk. However, an important question that has not been addressed in these studies is whether the increase in audit fees is also attributable to the risk premium charged by the auditor to cover potential litigation risks. This issue was raised by Hoag and Hollingsworth (2011) in their intertemporal analysis of audit fees and section 404 internal control opinions. They find that although audit fees decline for companies that remediate a material weakness, the corresponding fee reductions do not occur instantaneously. They note that a possible explanation for the "slow decrease is that clients who report a material weakness pose an additional business or litigation risk to their auditors, and this additional risk is persistently priced in the client's current and 3 Section 302, which became effective in August 2002, mandates that management evaluate disclosure control processes and procedures and certify the effectiveness of the controls. However, an independent audit of the effectiveness of internal control is not required. 4 See, for example, Pratt and Stice (1994) and Bell et al. (2001) . 5 The findings are also consistent with SAS55 and SAS77 that prescribe increased substantive testing when controls cannot be relied upon.
future audit fees" (page 198, Hoag and Hollingsworth 2011) . According to the audit pricing model developed by Simunic (1980) Accordingly, auditors consider the risks of earnings management in their assessments of litigation risk and incorporate these risks into their pricing decisions. In particular, Houston et al (1999) show that when the risk of irregularities is high, auditors add a risk premium to the audit fee to compensate them for bearing the business risk that can't be controlled by gathering additional audit evidence. Johnstone and Bedard (2001) and Bedard and Johnstone (2004) both find that, in addition to planning more audit hours, auditors charge higher billing rates for clients with earnings manipulation and fraud risks as a premium to compensate them for costs related to potential future litigation and reputational damage.
In light of the above discussion, it is reasonable to assume that intensified control risk gives rise to higher litigation risk through its effects on the risk of earnings management, resulting in auditors charging a higher risk premium to reduce their exposure to future litigation as well as applying more engagement effort toward detecting misstatements. Focusing on the risk premium component of audit fees, we posit that risk premiums increase (decline) in a manner consistent with weakened (strengthened) internal controls. More specifically, we expect that when a company's internal controls deteriorate (i.e., receiving a clean 404 opinion in the prior year and an adverse opinion in the current year), auditors respond to heightened control risk by increasing the risk premium. By similar logic, the remediation of internal control weakness (i.e., receiving an adverse 404 opinion in the prior year and a clean opinion in the current year) should result in lower risk premiums reflecting reduced control risk. Our first hypothesis is stated as follows in the alternative form:
H1: Changes in risk premiums are associated with changes in the internal control quality as evidenced by the SOX 404 internal control opinions.
Our next hypothesis considers the impact of the severity of internal control weakness on risk premium adjustments. General (company-level) material weaknesses (GW) such as the control environment or the overall financial reporting process represent a more serious concern regarding the reliability of financial reporting than account-specific weaknesses (SW) that are related to specific account balances or transaction-level processes. Whereas account-specific material weaknesses are identifiable and correctible by auditors through substantive testing, company-level weaknesses are more difficult to "audit around". In other words, general weaknesses are more likely to be associated with irregularities that are difficult to detect and correct. Consistent with this view, Doyle et al. (2007) find that only general weaknesses are significantly associated with lower accrual quality. Hammersley et al. (2008) find that stock returns are significantly more negative when internal control weaknesses are company-level due to investors being more concerned about the potential for material misstatements. Management fraud is also more likely to occur at companies with company-wide internal control problems because management is more capable of overriding control procedures. Hence, compared to account-specific material weaknesses, general internal control problems pose greater audit and litigation risks to auditors. Accordingly, we hypothesize that auditors recognize the difference in the level of risks represented by these two types of material weaknesses and adjust the risk premium in a manner consistent with the degree of severity of internal control weaknesses. We state our second hypothesis as follows in the alternative form:
H2: Changes in risk premiums vary depending on the severity of the underlying internal control problems.
Research Design
Regression Model
Our hypotheses relate changes in internal control opinions to changes in risk premiums. To test the hypotheses, we estimate the following audit fee model. The dependent variable is the change in the natural logarithm of audit fees (DAF). 7 Our variables of primary interest are a group of indicator variables representing the change in the level of control risk. We classify our sample firms into four groups based on the Section 404 disclosures in two successive years: 1) good internal controls in both years (GG); 2) good internal controls in a given year followed by bad controls next year (GB); 3) bad internal controls in a given year 7 We take the natural log of the audit fee variable to correct for violations of normality. The results, however, are similar when the raw measure of audit fee is used.
DAF = β
followed by good controls next year (BG); and 4) bad internal controls in both years (BB). The terms "good" and "bad" refer to unqualified and qualified SOX 404 opinions, respectively 8 . Since GG serves as the reference group for the test, the other three test variables measure the change in audit fees relative to that of GG firms.
To test whether audit firms adjust risk premiums in addition to altering their audit effort, we include in our model the audit delay measure (DAD) to control for the effect of audit effort. In its change form, DAD is calculated as the change in the number of days between the fiscal year end and the audit report date. 9 There exists a logical relationship between audit delay and the scope and extent of audit work as the more (fewer) hours an engagement consumes, the longer (shorter) the audit report lag will be. Knechel and Payne (2001) provide direct evidence that a lengthy audit delay is due to more audit hours and efforts being expended on an engagement. Ettredge et al (2006) find that the reporting of internal control weaknesses is strongly associated with longer audit delay, indicating that the audit delay measure captures a significant portion of the extended audit work. It is worth noting that audit delay measures audit effort with some noise. This is because audit delays can be influenced by many other unobservable determinants (e.g., auditors' favor to the particular client in scheduling audit time For completeness, we also estimate the audit delay model where the change in audit delay (DAD) serves as the dependent variable as follows: DAD = the same set of explanatory variables as in equation (1) excluding DAD (2) In light of the finding by Ettredge el al (2006) that the presence of material weaknesses is associated with longer audit delays, we expect the coefficients on GB, BG and BB to be highly significant if the audit delay measure captures the level of audit effort associated with managing control risk.
We also include in our models as control variables a comprehensive set of firm and auditor characteristics that have been identified as determinants of audit fees from prior studies. All control variables are measured as the change from year t-1 to year t.
We control for audit complexity by including firm size (DSIZE), presence of foreign Fargher and Gramling (2005) observe that the most common types of deficiencies that were remediated include inadequate staffing, inadequate segregation of duties, and problems with the financial closing process, account reconciliations, and application of accounting principles. 14 Ashbaugh-Skaife et al (2009) note that when a firm is involved in a merger or acquisition, control problems associated with integrating systems of newly acquired entities might lead to the deterioration in internal controls.
show that our sample's industry composition is closely aligned to the industry composition in the Compustat database.
(Insert Table 2 here)
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample data. fee increase for GB firms, suggesting there is some "stickiness" in audit fees (Munsif et al 2011) . Once the auditor increases the audit fee in response to ineffective internal controls, there is some resistance against reducing the fees to a great extent. We also find that BB firms experience a significant increase in audit fees (2.01%), suggesting the auditors are particularly concerned about the heightened control risk associated with firms failing to remediate internal control weaknesses and seek to reduce the risk by assessing higher fees. Interestingly, audit firms continue to increase fees for GG Overall, the univariate results provide evidence consistent with prior studies (Hoag and Hollingsworth 2011; Ettredge et al 2006) . We next present a multivariate regression analysis to provide direct tests of our risk premium hypotheses.
(Insert Table 3 here) To investigate whether auditors also manage control risk by adjusting risk premiums, we estimate an audit fee model where audit delay changes are included to control for audit effort. Column 2 presents the estimated results. As expected, the change in audit fees is an increasing function of the change in audit effort as evidenced by the significantly positive coefficient on DAD. More importantly, after controlling for audit effort changes, we find significant coefficients for all the internal control opinion groups. Specifically, the positive and significant coefficient on GB indicates that firms reporting deterioration in internal control incur additional audit 17 An examination of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all regressions indicates that the highest value is well below 5.00, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem. 18 We acknowledge that audit delay measures audit effort with some noise, given that the filing deadlines differ across time periods and filer types. However, we note the effect on audit delay of control risk for GB, BG and BB firms are all measured relative to GG firms (i.e. the baseline group). If any measure error exists, it would be held constant across these four subgroups and thus is not likely to bias our results. We further address this issue in our additional analyses.
Regression Results of Changes Analyses
fees beyond the costs associated with extended audit effort. In contrast, the negative and significant coefficient on BG indicates that there is an incremental reduction in audit fees over and above the fee decrease due to the reduced amount of audit work for firms remediating previously disclosed internal control weaknesses. These results provide evidence that auditors manage control risk by adjusting risk premiums as well as audit efforts.
We also observe that the coefficient on BB is negative in the audit delay model but positive in the audit fee model. This implies that the fee increase for firms failing to remediate previously disclosed material weaknesses stems primarily from an increase in the risk premium rather than increased audit efforts. A possible explanation is auditors become more efficient at dealing with the same internal control problems for these clients and thus the actual audit hours could decrease (Hoag and Hollingsworth 2011) . At the same time, the continued existence of material weaknesses raises serious concerns about the reliability of financial reporting and hence heightens the litigation risk. Auditors likely resort to charging a higher risk premium to cover potentially higher incremental costs associated with such clients.
Collectively, these findings lend support to Hypothesis 1 and provide new insights into the driving factors underlying the previously documented relationship between audit fee changes and changes in internal control quality. (Insert Table 4 here)
The Severity of Internal Control Weaknesses
Next, we test Hypothesis 2 by considering the severity of internal control weakness in our analyses. In particular, we investigate the extent to which the risk premium adjustment differs by the type of material weakness. Following Munsif et al.
(2011), we partition an internal control weakness into general weakness (GW) or account-specific weakness (SW) based on the material weakness categories compiled by Audit Analytics. We classify an internal control weakness as general weakness (GW) if the problem is in any one or more of the following categories: 1) Senior management's competency, tone, reliability issues; 2) accounting personnel resources, competency/training; 3) segregations of duties/design of controls (personnel); information technology, software, security, and access issues; 4) ethical or compliance issues with personnel; 5) ineffective, non-existent, or understaffed audit committee; 6) insufficient or non-existent internal audit function; and 7) ineffective regulatory compliance issues. We note that if a firm discloses both general and account-specific internal control problems, then we code that firm as having a general problem. In other words, a firm coded as having accounting specific problems by definition has no general problem. Depending on the Section 404 opinions received in two consecutive years, a company is classified into one of the nine distinct groups -GWGW, GWSW, GWNW, SWSW, SWGW, SWNW, NWSW, NWGW, NWNW, where GW, SW and NW represent general weakness, account specific weakness, and no weakness, respectively. For example, a GWNW firm is one that discloses a general weakness (GW) in year t-1, and subsequently receives a clean 404 opinion in year t. Such a classification scheme allows for cases in which the internal control disclosure shifts from a more severe type to a less severe one (GWSW) or vice versa (SWGW). The results from the audit delay model are presented in column 1. We make several important observations. First, the coefficients for both NWGW and NWSW are significantly positive, indicating that a breakdown in firm's internal control leads to an increase in audit delay. A further test of the difference between these two parameter estimates shows that NWGW is significantly more positive than NWSW (8.6967 versus 6.2238, p-value<0.0001), suggesting that auditors exert more effort in audits of firms reporting general control weaknesses. Second, we find that the coefficients on GWNW and SWNW are both negative and significant, indicating that remediation of material weaknesses results a decrease in audit delay. The F-test shows that the reduction in audit effort is greater for firms correcting general internal control problems (-6.5579 versus -4.1766, p-value<0.0001) . Third, the coefficient on GWSW (SWGW) is significantly negative (positive). This suggests auditors adjust the scope and extent of audit work even when there is only a partial remediation (degradation) of internal control deficiencies. In contrast, we observe no change in audit effort when the severity of control weaknesses remains unchanged (GWGW and SWSW).
We next discuss the results from the audit fee model presented in column 2
where audit delay is included to control for the effect of audit effort. First, as with the audit delay model, the coefficients on NWGW and NWSW are significantly positive and the difference between the two coefficient estimates is statistically significant (0.1737 versus 0.0496, p-value<0.0001) . The result suggests that auditors charge a higher risk premium to clients reporting general weaknesses than those disclosing account specific problems, consistent with the notion that general weaknesses are more difficult to audit around and rectify and thus reflect a higher level of risk.
Second, we find negative and significant coefficients on GWNW and SWNW, suggesting that auditors lower risk premiums in response to reduced control risk.
However, we find no significant difference for GWNW and SWNW. This seems to suggest that auditors consider the type of weakness when adjusting upward the risk premium, but not in the case of a downward adjustment. While only conjecture on our part, a possible explanation for the asymmetric pattern of risk premium adjustment is that auditors are not confident about clients who have previously disclosed internal control problems and thus do not distinguish firms by the type of weakness when reducing the risk premium. This is consistent with auditors taking a conservative approach in their pricing decisions. Third, the coefficient on SWGW is significantly positive, while the coefficient on GWSW is negative but insignificant, indicating that auditors raise the risk premium when the internal control disclosure changes from a less severe type to a more severe one, but are reluctant to lower the premium in case of partial remediation. The evidence again supports the view of auditor conservatism.
Finally, we find positive and significant coefficients on both GWGW and SWSW.
Contrasting this with the insignificant results for GWGW and SWSW in the audit delay model in column 1, it seems to suggest while the continued existence of material weaknesses raises serious concerns about the reliability of financial reporting and hence heightened litigation risk, instead of performing additional substantive tests, auditors rely on charging higher risk premiums to compensate themselves for bearing higher risk.
(Insert Table 5 here)
To sum up, the findings reported in Tables 4 and 5 jointly present a fairly consistent picture of how changes in the effectiveness of internal control relate to changes in auditor efforts and risk premiums. We find strong evidence that the audit fee bear a risk premium for control risk. It is worth noting that although we find some evidence that the adjustment of risk premium differs by the type of material weakness, such an adjustment is more sensitive to increases in control risk, reflecting auditor conservatism.
Additional Analyses
Levels Analysis
The implementation of a changes analysis allows for a more precise examination of the risk adjustment process that auditors apply around the remediation/degradation of internal control weaknesses. As an additional test, we also perform levels analysis to investigate the cross sectional difference between the level of risk premiums for companies that report material weaknesses and companies that receive clean 404
opinions. Consistent with the discussions for the changes analysis, we hypothesize that 1) the risk premium is significantly higher for firms disclosing internal control weaknesses, and 2) the level of risk premium is greater for companies reporting general weaknesses than those reporting account specific problems.
The results of the levels regressions are reported in Table 6 . All the changes variables are replaced by their corresponding level measures. For brevity, we only present the results for the audit fee model 20 . In column 1, the test variable MW is an indicator variable coded 1 for firms reporting a material weakness and zero otherwise.
The results show that both MW and audit delay (AD) are positively and significantly associated with audit fee (AF), suggesting that MW explains a significant amount of variance in audit fee over and above that explained by AD. This provides evidence that the audit fee contains a risk premium for control risk above the amounts required to cover the costs of conducting additional audit work. In column 2, MW is replaced by the indicator variables for GW and SW. While the coefficients of both variables are significantly positive, the magnitude of the coefficient estimate for GW is 20 In untabulated analysis, we find that, consistent with our expectation, firms with material weaknesses have longer audit delays, and the reporting of general weaknesses is associated with longer audit delays than that of account specific problems.
significantly higher than that for SW (0.2781 versus 0.1060), suggesting that auditors assess a higher risk premium for control risks arising from general weaknesses relative to account specific problems. Considering these results in conjunction with those from the changes analysis, we find consistent evidence supporting the notion that the audit fee reflects a risk premium for control risk and such a premium varies depending on the severity of the underlying internal control problems.
Insert Table 6 here
Annual regressions
This study covers a much longer sample period ( Consistent with this expectation, recent research has documented a decrease in audit fees following the implementation of AS5 (Doogar et al. 2010; Krishnan et al. 2011 ).
Although employing a large longitudinal sample increases our ability to draw more reliable inferences regarding our research hypotheses, the empirical results could be confounded by these multiple accounting regulations due to their potential impacts on the auditor behavior. To assess the sensitivity of our results to these regulatory changes, we rerun our main analyses for each year separately. Estimating annual regressions also reduces the possibility that p-values are overstated due to polling over years of observations that are not fully independent. Untabulated analysis shows that the results from the annual regressions are stable across the six years and are generally consistent with the findings obtained from the pooled sample.
Size Analysis
Prior research has shown that large clients (or Big N auditors) have greater negotiation power than small clients (or non-Big N auditors). In addition, as noted above, effective November 15, 2006, large accelerated filers would be subject to the newly instituted 60-day Form 10-K filing deadline, whereas small accelerated filers continue to comply with the 75-day deadline. The different requirements regarding the filing deadline might yield differential results across filer types. We therefore perform tests separately investigate whether size affects our results. First, we partition our sample based on whether the firm is a large or small accelerator filer. A large accelerated filer is defined as a company that has a public float of $700 million or more. In our second test, we partition the sample based on the auditor type (Big4 vs.
non-Big4). Our final test partitions firms into two subgroups based on their fiscal year-end total assets. Once again, the inferences drawn from size analyses are qualitatively similar to our primary analysis. In combination, these three tests suggest that our results are not driven by any sub-group of the sample.
Conclusion
This study addresses the important question of whether audit fees reflect risk premiums in the presence of control risk. We hypothesize that increased control risk gives rises to heightened risk of earnings management, which in turns increases the likelihood of litigation against auditors. To the extent that the risk of errors and irregularities are high and normal audit procedures cannot reduce the risks to tolerable levels, a premium is added to the fee to compensate auditors for potential future litigation losses. We test this hypothesis by investigating whether control risk provides additional explanatory power above that provided by audit effort in explaining audit pricing. Employing a changes analysis approach, we find strong evidence of auditors responding to increased control risk by charging fees above the costs of conducting additional audits. This suggests that auditors adjust risk premiums as well as audit procedures in face of increasing control risk. In further analysis, we find some evidence that changes in risk premiums are also associated with changes in the severity of the underlying internal control problems. Auditors assess a higher risk premium to clients reporting general weaknesses compared to firms reporting account specific problems. However, the reduction in risk premiums is indistinguishable between these two types of weaknesses when clients remediate their internal control problems. This result is consistent with auditors taking a more conservative approach when pricing the control risk for clients that have previously experienced internal control problems, regardless of the type of weakness involved. Hogan and Wilkins (2008) called for additional research that investigates whether higher audit fees in the presence of internal control weakness during the new SOX 404 reporting regime are due to extended audit effort or a higher risk premium.
Our study thus can be viewed as a direct response to this call. The findings in this study lead us to conclude that the positive relation between internal control disclosures and audit fees documented in prior research (Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Hoitash et al. 2008; Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Munsif et al 2011; Hoag and Hollingworth 2011 ) is driven by changes in both risk premiums and auditor efforts.
Overall, this study provides a more comprehensive analysis of the dynamics between audit fee responses and changes in internal control quality, and of the distinct role of audit effort versus risk premium in explaining the variance in audit fees. The findings reported in our study further add to our understanding of the effects of the SOX 404 requirements on the cost of internal control auditing.
One limitation of this study is our use of the audit delay measure as a proxy for the scope and extent of audit work. We acknowledge that audit delay measures audit effort with some noise. This is because audit delays can be influenced by many other unobservable determinants (e.g., auditors' favor to the particular client in scheduling audit time). Also note that we estimate audit delay by counting the number of days from the fiscal year end to the audit report date because actual audit delays-the number of days between the start and finish of audit work-are not publicly available. Therefore, our conclusions regarding audit effort versus risk premium are valid to the extent that the audit delay measure adequately captures the effects of audit effort. = Change in the natural logarithm of the firm's market value of equity; DFRGN = Change in ratio of sales made by foreign subsidiaries to total sales; DSEG = Change in the number of business segments; DABACC = Change in the absolute value of total accruals divided by total assets; DRECV = Change in the ratio of total receivables to total assets; DINVT = Change in the ratio of total inventory to total assets; DOPIN = 1 if a firm receives an unqualified opinion in t but not in t-1, and 0 otherwise; DDY = 1 if a firm has a December fiscal year end in t but not in t-1, and 0 otherwise; DBIGN = 1 if a firm is audited by a Big N in t but not in t-1, and 0 otherwise; DCHG = 1 if a firm switches its auditor in t, and 0 otherwise; Firm characteristics DLVRG = Change in ratio of debt to total assets; DLOSS = 1 if earnings before extraordinary items is less than 0 in t but not in t-1, and 0 otherwise; DCATA = Change in ratio of current assets to total assets; DEBIT = Change in ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets; DQUICK = Change in ratio of current assets (less inventory) to current liabilities: and DREST = 1 if a firm announces restatement in t, but not in t-1, and 0 otherwise. Notes: NW, GW, and SW refer to no weakness, general weakness, and account specific weakness, respectively. A combination of any two of the three internal control opinions indicate the change in internal control status. For example, GWNW represents a firm reporting GW in year t-1 and subsequently receiving a clean 404 opinion in year t. P-values are based on two-tailed tests.
See Table 1 for the definition of other variables. 
